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After the Revolution in Corporate
Law
Roberta Romano
Corporate law is a field that underwent as thorough a revolution in the
1980s as can be imagined, in scholarship and in practice, methodology, and
organization. The term "revolution" is invoked all too often in popular cul-
ture, but as this article will suggest, it is entirely apt in this case. The revolu-
tion in corporate law has been so thorough and profound that those working
in the field today would have considerable difficulty recognizing what it was
like twenty-five to thirty years ago. I was fortunate to have started out in law
teaching in that turbulent, transitional era, for it was an exciting time to be in
corporate law.
This revolution has produced one of the more interdisciplinary fields oflaw.
One measure of the field's transformation is that the submissions to the annual
meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, which now number
in the hundreds, are overwhelmingly dominated by corporate law scholars;
they could fill up most of the program, were the Association not to limit the
number of corporate-law-related sessions to encourage broader program cov-
erage and participation. The integration of finance and economic theory into
legal analysis is true not of corporate law scholarship alone but has been ex-
tended to practice and judicial decisionmaking.
This article first explains why the revolution in corporate law in the 1980s
was not fortuitous: it followed a revolution in corporate finance and the theory
of the firm, and was mid-wived in a period of dynamic innovation in corporate
transactions. The article then touches briefly on the course of the revolution,
and how it reached all aspects of corporate law-from practitioners to academ-
ics, to regulatory agencies and U.S. and state Supreme Court opinions. It con-
cludes by discussing the implications of the sea change in corporate law schol-
arship and practice for legal education in the twenty-first century, especially
for law schools where research plays a central role.
Roberta Romano is the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law and Director of the Yale Law
School Center for the Study of Corporate Law, Research Associate, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research and Fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute. This article is based on
the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Inaugural Lecture given at Yale Law School on September 21, 2005.
My thanks to the editors for helpful sggestions.
Journal of Legal Education, Volume 55, Number 3 (September 2005)
HeinOnline -- 55 J. Legal Educ. 343 2005
After the Revolution in Corporate Law 343
Background to the Revolution in Corporate Law
In the 1960s, corporate law was an ossified, stagnant field. Dean Bayless
Manning aptly summed up the situation in 1962: "Corporation law, as a field
of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States.... We have nothing left but
our great empty corporation statutes-towering skyscrapers of rusted girders,
internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.'" Most state cor-
poration codes at the time were relics of the turn of the century; Delaware was
to modernize its code in 1967, and the first revision of the Model Business
Corporation Act was completed in 1969. The state of corporate law scholar-
ship was not much different from that of corporation statutes.
We can trace the intellectual origin of what would become the new para-
digm for corporate law to a pioneering article on mergers published in 1965 by
Henry Manne only a few years after Manning's comment.' The article coined
the term "the market for corporate control," and challenged the conventional
view of mergers as anticompetitive by contending (1) that control changes in
mergers played an efficiency-enhancing role by replacing poorly performing
managers and (2) that takeovers were preferable to mergers as an acquisition
device because they avoided management's transactional veto, which was re-
quired by merger statutes. But that article appeared in the Journal ifPolitical
Economy (a leading economics journal) and not in a law review, and Manne's
contribution went largely unrecognized in corporate law scholarship for close
to two decades.
The lag in the acknowledgment of the significance of Manne's contribu-
tions was no accident. The perspective of legal scholars on corporate law in
the 1960s and 1970S differed dramatically from our contemporary understand-
ing: as]udge Ralph Winter described it, corporate law back in those days was
treated as a "species ofconsumer protection law," based on the perception that
managers ran corporations, under the aegis of state corporate law; with the
objective of exploiting shareholders, and that neither the states nor markets
could be trusted to constrain managers or otherwise protect investors) In line
with this view, eighty law professors (which would appear to have been the deci-
I. Bayless Manning, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 Yale
L.J. 223, 2+5 n·37 (1962). William Carney also summarizes the state of the field as having
reached an intellectual dead-end in a tribute to Henry Manne, in William Carney, The Leg-
acy of the "Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 215,221-25 (1999)'
2. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. no
(1965)'
3. Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate
Law ix (Washington, D.C, '993)' See also Carney, supra note I. For Manne's description of
his experience at the time, see Henry G. Manne, How Law and Economics was Marketed
in a Hostile World: A Very Personal History, in Francesco Parisi and Charles K. Rowley
eds., The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the Founding Fathers 309,311-12
(Northampton, Mass., 2005).
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sive majority of corporate law specialists) signed a petition in 1976 advocating
Congress' adoption of a national corporation law to preempt the states.
Only one year later Winter challenged that view in an article that identified
fundamental analytical flaws in the conventional understanding embodied in
the law professors' petition. In that understanding, state law was a "race for the
bottom" that facilitated managers' exploitation of shareholders.4 The article
contends that managers would not select legal regimes that systematically dis-
advantaged investors because that would raise their cost of capital compared to
competitors located in regimes more favorable to investors, and consequently
diminish their career prospects (they risked being fired as their firms went
bankrupt or were acquired). Like Henry Manne's article on mergers, Winter's
economic analysis of the production of state corporate law went against the
grain of the prevailing understanding and, like Manne's, Winter's article was
largely ignored by the academy. Winter and Manne were truly voices in the
wilderness and their analyses were widely regarded as "unsound~ by their con-
temporaries. Today, decades later, their approach is mainstream corporate law,
and serves as a starting point of analyses by advocates and critics of mergers and
acquisitions and of state corporate law.
This transformation of the discourse is part and parcel of a revolution that
effected a paradigm shift in how we understand corporations, business trans-
actions, and the legal rules governing them, that took place in the decades
following Manne's and Winter's publications. Manne and Winter were not
any less skillful analysts or policy advocates than the generation of scholars
that followed. Rather, the methodology that would have enabled Manne and
Winter to compel their contemporaries to confront (if not accept) their anal-
yses by enabling them to demonstrate that their hypotheses regarding how
managers behaved and how acquisitions and the market for control worked
to discipline managers were correct, was not in place when those articles were
written. The appropriate methods were not yet developed. Only later could
their hypotheses be tested and their insights fully appreciated. The impetus
for their contemporaries to update their prior beliefs concerning regulation
was therefore lacking. Furthermore, the new transactions that underscored the
intellectual vacuousness of the then-dominant doctrinal paradigm did not yet
exist. It was only after those methodological and transactional developments
that the revolution took hold.
The Revolution in Corporate Finance
There are three distinct strands to the story of the transformation of corpo-
rate law in the latter half of the twentieth century. An important milestone was
the pioneering casebook on corporate finance by Victor Brudney and Marvin
4. Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
Leg. Stud, 251 (1977).
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Chirelstein,5 which introduced a new methodology, modern finance, into the
business law curriculum.
Chirelstein had been dragooned by Dean Eugene Rostow into teaching
what was then called Business Units II when he arrived at Yale Law School
in 1965 from Rutgers, where he and Brudney had been colleagues. What was
there to do with a course that consisted "entirely of case-annotations for com-
monly used bond indentures and other boiler-plate documents," and was "the
most boring and insignificant course ever offered anywhere at any time in any
language" (as Chirelstein put it)? The 1960s were a fervent period in the theo-
retical development of finance, which had previously been an unexciting, de-
scriptive field involving financial ratio analysis and rules of thumb. Finance
had been as dead a field as corporate law, but no longer. Reading the Journal
ofFinance in those days was certainly more intellectually stimulating than read-
ing the dreary provisions in bond indentures, and Chirelstein thought that was
just the thing to spice up Business Units II.
Brudney and Chirelstein were intrigued by the notions of random walk and
efficient markets buzzing around in the air, and what impact these concepts
would have on the liability and property rules relating to corporate law. They
put these ideas together into a casebook published in 1972. The casebook could
not, however, have appeared much earlier because of the relative infancy of the
tools of modern finance. A brief chronology of the theoretical breakthroughs
in finance conveys the point:
• 1952: modern financial theory was born with the publication of Harry
Markowitz's dissertation, which developed what is referred to as the portfo-
lio theory of investment decisionmaking, or portfolio selection, introducing a
security's risk, as well as its return, into the decisional mix.
• 1958 and 1962: Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, referred to in
the literature as "M & M," developed irrelevance theories of firm capital struc-
ture and valuation launching a debate that continues to this day.
• 1964-65= John Lintner and William Sharpe specified the capital asset
pricing model, better known in the literature as the CAPM, a model for mea-
suring risk. 6 This important development made Markowitz's portfolio theory
more tractable-one could solve for the optimal portfolio without complex
computer programming-and it put the theory into an empirically testable
form, which is critical for a theory's acceptability.
In T990, Markowitz, Miller, and Sharpe shared the Nobel memorial prize in
economics (Modigliani had won the prize years earlier). With that award, we
5· Victor Brudney and Marvin A. Chirelstein, Cases and Materials on Corporate Finance
(Mineola, N.Y., I972).
6. Jack Treynor also independently discovered the CAPM in a paper written in 1962, but that
work was not recognized as such until many years after the publications by Sharpe and Lint-
ner; even Treynor did not recognize the importance of the insight in his paper at the time
it was written. See, e.g., Perry Mehrling, Fischer Black and the Revolutionary Idea of
Finance 59, 73 (Hoboken, N.J., 2005)'
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can say that finance had arrived. The relative recency of the award, indicating
acceptance of finance's contribution to economics, is a further reminder of how
trailblazing the Brudney and Chirelstein casebook was, in its taking an "infant"
discipline as the mode of analyzing the key concerns of corporate law.
lust as the CAPM was an important step in the progress of finance theory
because of its testability, a major component of finance research consists of test-
ing the accuracy of pricing models.7 In this regard, finance differs from many
other fields in economics because it has a decidedly empirical focus. The most
important empirical finance methodology for policy purposes consists of what
the literature refcrs to as event studies, which measure the effect of specified
" " k'events on stoc pnces.
Event studies were developed in conjunction with testing the concept of
an efficient market, the idea that market prices incorporate information; in
an efficient market, abnormal profits cannot be made by trading on public
information. The modern literature on efficient markets dates from an article
by Paul Samuelson published in 1965 and reached a broad audience with the
publication of Eugene Fama's classic survey in 1970.8 The first modern event
studies were published by accountants in 1968 and by financial economists in
1969; this constitutes the final finance innovation of particular relevance to the
revolution in corporate law. Event studies are now a cottage industry, literally
hundreds having been published in nearly all finance journals. They provided
a methodology for testing Manne's and Winter's hypotheses regarding the
market for control and corporate charters. In that regard their development
was as critical a component in the revolution in corporate law as that of the
finance theory they were testing, and they have had an important impact on the
course of corporate law and corporate governance. The widespread applica-
tion of the technique did not occur in academia, however, until the burst of
takeover activity in the 1980s.
In a nutshell, the major breakthroughs in modern finance were still quite
recent and were not fully assimilated in the finance profession when the Brud-
ney and Chirelstein casebook was published and began the effort to connect
the learning of modern finance with business law. The effort simply could not
have begun much earlier. It should also be evident that the intellectual roots of
modern corporate law scholarship are quite distinct from the standard micro-
economic methodology applied in the law and economics literature. This is an
important distinction to which I will return when considering the implications
of the revolution for legal education and scholarship.
7. In a well-known critique of the testability of the CAPM, Richard Roll emphasized that the
market portfolio is unobservable and hence tests are of the mean-variance efficiency of a
proxy and not the true market portfolio, but subsequent empirical and theoretical work has
indicated that his concern is not a problem in practice. See John Y. Campbell et aI., The
Econometrics of Financial Markets 213-15 (Princeton, 1997)'
8. John Campbell, Andrew Lo, and Craig MacKinlay sketch the modern development of the
efficient market hypothesis and the event study methodology. See id. at 20, 150.
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A Parallel Revolution in Microeconomics: The New Theory ofthe Firm
Paralleling the intellectual revolution that occurred in modern finance in
the 1960s, a similar revolution was occurring in economics regarding the theory
of the firm in the mid-1970s. This is the second strand contributing to the revo-
lution in corporate law.
In the mid-1970s, a number of economists attempted to delve inside the
black box of the firm as it was characterized in neo-classical economics (the
firm as a production function), and to understand it on a micro-analytic level.
Two lines of development in this research agenda have had a lasting impact on
the thinking of corporate law academics. The first is transaction cost econom-
ics. This research is associated most closely with Oliver Williamson, whose
foundational book on business organization, Markets and Hierarchies, was
published in 1975.9 The second is the agency costs theory of the firm. This line
of research was introduced in 1976 by Michael Jensen and William Meckling,
who, working from the corporate finance literature, gave systematic econom-
ic content to the much earlier key observation of Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means in 1932, that ownership was separated frQm control in the modern U.S.
corporation.'o Both of these theoretical approaches for analyzing firms were
mathematicized and refined by economists in the ensuing decades and the
microanalytic approach to the firm has come to permeate the microeconomics
and industrial organization literatures.
Revolution in Corporate Practice: Doing Deals in the Era of the
Hostile Takeover
The third critical strand that, when conjoined with the analytical tools of
modern finance and the new theory of the firm, produced a full-blown revolu-
tion in corporate law, came from the world of corporate practice: an explo-
sion in innovative deals. Just as the new theoretical developments in finance
were rapidly being integrated into the business school curriculum, there was a
boom in acquisitive transactions of public corporations and a new dynamic in
control changes emerged. This was the era of the hostile takeover, undertaken
through a novel, highly leveraged structure, made possible by innovations in
transaction financing developed by Michael Milken and his investment bank,
Drexel Burnham Lambert.
Before Milken's new issue operation began, the junk bond market consisted
principally of downgraded debt of established firms. Milken reinvented junk
bonds as a financing mechanism for new ventures, and his support of a market
for the new issues that he placed, enabled small firms to acquire large ones
9. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications
(New York, 1975). This line of research works out of a now-celebrated article that was all but
ignored for decades, Ronald Coase's 1932 article on the nature of the firm, for which, along
with his article on social costs, he received the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 1991.
10. Michael C, Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3]. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).
HeinOnline -- 55 J. Legal Educ. 348 2005
Journal ofLegal Education
previously considered impervious to unsolicited bids, and changed the way
business was conducted in the United States. The use of such financing for
hostile takeovers was in fact a relatively small segment of the high-yield market
created by Milken, although no doubt the most visible part; the instruments
provided relatively inexpensive financing for many small and mid-sized firms
in what were then new and underdeveloped sectors of the economy-providers
of cellular phones, cable television, and personal computers, among others."
The new financing techniques catapulted Drexel, which had been a sleepy
investment bank, into a prominent and highly profitable role." There was also
a parallel rapid growth in law firms specializing in mergers and acquisitions
transactions, working on the hostile bidder side as well as on the defense.
More importantly, lawyers and courts needed new ways to talk and think
about, and respond to, these novel transactions: for example, what should be
the fiduciary standard for the actions of managers and boards of directors in
response to a hostile bid? How should the fairness of the price in a negotiated
or hostile acquisition be evaluated? Should shareholder consent to actions
that could be used to thwart takeovers be discounted because that consent had
been granted before takeovers had become common and those actions took on
a defensive use? More concretely, how could an effective defense be structured
while preserving flexibility to entertain alternative bids? The theoretical devel-
opments in finance and in the theory of the firm literature provided the lan-
guage and the analytical tools to address a host of challenging legal issues.
The Transformation ofCorporate Law
As the decade progressed and deals continued apace with the transaction
scale ever-increasing, the profitability of mergers and acquisitions practice cor-
respondingly increased, attracting the attention of more established invest-
ment banks and law firms. As the old line firms entered the takeover business,
the nature of business law practice was fundamentally reconfigured. Since the
best scholarship in corporate law is in a symbiotic relation with real world
transactions, that scholarship followed suit.
Modern finance and the new economic theories of the firm provided the
analytical tools for understanding the new deals transforming corporate law
practice in the 1980s, and how the legal system should respond to those chal-
lenges. A groundbreaking article by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel in
1981, which advocated a change in the fiduciary standard applied in takeovers,
integrated the finance and agency costs literature into a theory of takeovers
II. See, e.g., Glenn Yago, Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured Corporate
America (New York, 1991).
12. The firm disappeared after the SEC filed civil charges against it and Milken for securities
fraud and it pled guilty to criminal charges, but its novel techniques survived and became
ubiquitous.
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informed by Manne's central 1965 insighL'3 In contrast to the period when
Manne was writing the timing was ripe for these ideas to take root in main-
stream discourse; the old doctrinal mode of analysis was abandoned as hope-
lessly inadequate to the task. Modern finance and the economic theory of the
firm enabled a new generation of scholars to craft rationales for advocating
significant alterations of the fiduciary standards courts applied in acquisitions.
They were able to draw support in that endeavor from a sizeable empirical
literature that demonstrated significant gains to shareholders from hostile
takeovers. Although the courts never came over entirely to the dominant per-
spective in the academic literature (which advocated restrictions on manage-
ment responses to hostile bids), that literature was without doubt one of many
factors affecting courts' perception of takeovers, and, in particular, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's 1985 revision of the fiduciary standard applicable in the
hostile takeover context.'4
It is important to highlight the symbiotic relationship between practice and
legal scholarship as it was developing in the 1980s, as this relation is a critical
factor to which I will return when discussing implications. The generation of
corporate law scholars coming of age in the era of hostile takeovers embraced
the interdisciplinary approach that had distanced Manne and Winter from
their contemporaries. At the same time, Wall Street was being populated by
individuals, often referred to as "quants," who were trained in the new asset pric-
ing models and quantitative methods. Investment banks also became heavily
involved in all stages of the takeover process; takeovers were lucrative and
the banks offered needed valuation skills. Law firms followed suit, becoming
increasingly conversant in finance as well, working alongside the investment
banks to devise more effective strategies for companies' defenses and responses
to defenses, and to ensure that complex merger documents embodied under-
standings regarding warranties and representations, and protected buyers' in-
vestments and sellers' fiduciary obligations. This was a period of ferment and
innovation; lawyers' creative ingenuity in fashioning defenses was reflected in a
new colorful terminology ofcrown jewels, white knights, bear hugs, greenmail,
scorched earth and Pacman defenses, golden parachutes, poison pills, and the
'3. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HaIV. 1. Rev. ,,6, ('98,). Parallel contributions were
made by Lucian Bebchuk and Ronald Gilson, who engaged in a debate with Easterbrook
and Fischel over the proper extent of management responses to bids in the November '982
issue of the Stanford Law Review.
'4. The literature was cited in the Delaware Supreme Court's decision to enhance judicial scru-
tiny, although the Court also explicitly rejected Easterbrook and Fischel's advocacy ofa rule
of managerial passivity: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 954-955 nn. 9
& IO (1985). For a discussion of the many factors, political, social, and economic, affecting
the Delaware courts' takeover jurisprudence, sec]effrcy N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets,
and Courts, 9' Colum. 1. Rev. '93' ('99')'
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like. Notwithstanding considerable efforts to derail these developments legis-
latively, the new transactions were here to stay. '5
In academia, the economic analyses of Manne and Winter received em-
pirical support, as event studies tested the hypotheses advanced by Manne on
merger motivations and by Winter on state corporate law. The studies' findings
were most consistent with the efficiency (managerial disciplining) rather than
anticompetitive explanation of mergers, and the pro-investor (race to the top)
rather than manager exploitation (race to the bottom) interpretation of state
law, the positions espoused by Manne and Winter that had cast them as intel-
lectual outliers earlier. ,6 This is not to say that contributors to the field did not,
or do not, continue to have strong substantive policy disagreements or dispute
the interpretation or significance of empirical findings. They did and do. But
there was now a consensus on the appropriate mode of analysis-that it should
be informed by finance and the new economic theories of the firm. Although
prominent practitioners questioned the use of economics in the academic lit-
erature, disputing conclusions as wrong-headed, their practice demanded that
they too become increasingly conversant in finance and economics, and they
did, as they worked on deals in tandem with investment bankers.
The influence of finance theory did not end with its impact on corporate
practice and legal scholarship, but extended to the courts and U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission. In the 1980s, several remarkable judicial opinions
used the learning of modern finance in fashioning legal rules. In 1985, the
Delaware Supreme Court revised the longstanding methodology used for ap-
praisal (the statutory right to receive the "fair" value for shares acquired in a
merger as determined by a court) to include any method generally accepted
by the financial community (by which the court meant modern finance).'7 In
1988, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the efficient market hypothesis as the
basis for demonstrating proof of reliance in federal securities fraud litigation. IS
Following the Supreme Court's lead, the SEC began applying the event study
technique in insider trading cases to identify liability (whether false disclosures
or omissions were material) and to measure damages.'9 In addition, through-
15. For a discussion of state and federal efforts to regulate hostile takeovers see, e.g., Roberta
Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 457 (1988).
16. Sec, e.g., Espen Eckbo, Horizontal Mergers, Collusion and Stockholder Wealth, II J. Fin.
Econ. 241 (1983); Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters:
"Unhealthy Competition" vs. Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
17. Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 497 A.2d 792 (1985)' Rutheford Campbell tabulates how the meth-
ods applied in Delaware appraisal cases thereafter changed considerably, producing more
economically rational valuations. Rutheford Campbell, The Impact of Modern Finance
Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. I (2003)'
18. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
19. Two former SEC economists pinpoint the initial cases in which the SEC made usc of the
methodology as occurring in 1988 and 1989, citing Basic u. Leuinson as providing the "intellec-
tual basis" for the application. Mark L. Mitchell and Jeffry M. Netter,-The Role of Financial
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out the '980s it opposed managers' defensive tactics against hostile bids, influ-
enced by the finance literature, which had assimilated Manne's understanding
of the market for control!O
Modern finance and the economic theory of the firm offered analytical in-
sight beyond takeovers. Easterbrook and Fischel's book, the Economic Structure if
Corporate Law, published in 1991,21 coinciding with the decline in takeover activity
at the end of the 1980s, synthesized the whirlwind changes in the state of know1-
edge, to which they had significantly contributed. It is the other bookend to
the Brudney and Chirelstein casebook, delineating the time frame within which
the field was transformed. The book's publication marked the end of the revo-
lutionary phase in corporate law scholarship, as modern finance and econom-
ics had come to be the conventional analytical approach to corporate law.
The most important reason for the adoption of the new analytical approach
was, no doubt, the beauty of the intellectual fit. Modern finance had become
the language of business, and lawyers needed to be knowledgeable about it in
order to serve their clients. As takeovers flourished, those deals set the teach-
ing and research agenda, and finance and the theory of the firm provided the
tools for analyzing the deals and the novel legal issues they raised. In addition,
the metric of event studies, the impact of corporate policies on stock prices,
meshed well for policy analysis within the framework of U.S. corporate law,
which imposes fiduciary obligations on directors to act for the benefit of the
shareholders. Finally, the Anglo-American legal tradition has been instrumen-
tal in its approach, and this jurisprudential perspective is most consonant with
interdisciplinary research grounded in positive theories of behavior: because
the objective of the law is to affect behavior, a theory that can predict behavior
is essential to get the incentives right. Modern finance and the theory of the
firm offered plausible theories of investor and manager behavior and therefore
quickly came to be pervasive in analyses of corporate law.
Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, 49 Bus. Law. 545,548, 5F77 (1994)'
20. As Kenneth Lehn has noted, in what is perhaps the "ultimate compliment that a scholar can
receive from his profession," there was a marked decline in citations to Manne's article on
mergers in the Journal of Financial Economics (the "predominant finance journal [publish-
ing] papers on corporate control") as the number of publications on takeovers exponentially
increased, suggesting that "the ideas espoused by Manne in 1965 [were] now so commonly
accepted by financial economists" that they did not feel the need to cite anything in support
of those propositions as they had in earlier years when the transactions were novel, the lit-
erature new, and the article was frequently cited. Kenneth R. Lehn, Some Observations on
Henry Manne's Contributions to Financial Economics, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rey. 263,266 (1999)'
21. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of the Corporation
(Cambridge, Mass., 1991).
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Implications of the Revolution in Corporate Law for Legal Education
The revolution in corporate law affects all aspects of business law educa-
tion. I will focus on implications for the law school curriculum, law schools'
relation with other units of the university in which they are situated, and law
schools' relation with the practice of business law.
Curriculum
As I hope is evident from the earlier discussion, the transformation in legal
scholarship and practice created a need for technical proficiency on the part of
business lawyers and teachers. With regard to the future, the level of technical
proficiency in finance and economics will surely only be greater than present-
day requirements. In response to these developments, law schools have added
courses on corporate finance and mergers and acquisitions (often referred to
as deals courses) to their curriculum. But that response, in my judgment, is
thoroughly inadequate.
The central problem is that those newer courses combined with other cours-
es in the typical law school curriculum do not provide the technical level of
knowledge that business lawyers need to master to be at the forefront of their
profession!' Law schools are not well-positioned to provide that knowledge
on their own: most law faculties do not have the staffing to offer, for instance,
the requisite class sections of finance, accounting, and so forth; they often
barely manage to staff the introductory and a few advanced corporate law
courses with tenure track faculty. Some law firms provide instruction in ac-
counting, and some consulting firms offer mini-business school programs for
new employees who lack an MBA, but the typical law firm-level resolution to
this problem is best characterized as a sink or swim approach.
A cavalier response might be that law students are bright and they can learn
what they need to know on the job, rationalizing the institutional indifference
to the situation. Such a flippant answer can most politely be characterized
as misguided, less politely as silly. It is plainly not tenable for a professional
school to refuse to meet its obligation to educate individuals for their profes-
sion. If that is not central to its mission, then what is? In due course a law
school that chose to follow such a path would find its reputation in a down-
ward spiral. Yes, law students are bright and much can be learned on the job;
but we are failing them when we do not provide them with the opportunity to
master the essential knowledge they need for having successful careers. partic-
ularly hard-to-master knowledge that is neither easily nor quickly mastered on
one's own. If you think I am overdramatizing the situation, ask yourself, how
many autodidacts in the accounting or finance profession have you met lately?
While the best business lawyers do not need to become financial economists
22. It goes without saying that the education is inadequate for a career in business, which some
law school graduates pursue, but such preparation does not go to a law school's core educa-
tional mission.
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or accountants, they need a thorough working knowledge and mastery of the
concepts and the relevant literature.
It is also not a satisfactory response to shrug off the problem by acknowledg-
ing that there are likely to be gaps in law school graduates' knowledge con-
cerning the legal landscape as substantial as those in their technical business
knowledge. For, I believe, on-the-job-training can more successfully address
the former gap. In short, law schools are doing a poor job when it comes to
educating the preeminent business lawyers of the next generation and the fact
that hardly any school is doing a particularly good job is no excuse. We ought
to do something about this unacceptable situation. Simply put, the law school
curriculum has not caught up with the transformation in the profession and
legal scholarship.
But it is also not the comparative advantage of law schools to provide the
sort of general business education that the contemporary business lawyer re-
quires to be able to offer the highest quality service to clients and society. The
most straightforward solution lies in actively encouraging students seeking
a business law career to enroll in joint degree programs with management
schools. Yet, widespread implementation of this solution is currently not
feasible because the student must forgo a year of employment and incur an
additional year of tuition in the existing joint degree program framework, a
costly impediment to most individuals' enrollment. Obtaining the necessary
knowledge without being in such a program is also a non-starter because it is
difficult, sometimes impossible, for a non-joint degree student to enroll in core
management school courses. Enrollment in those classes is typically capped,
so that management schools can better educate their own students. And law
schools, following ABA strictures, limit the number of non-law school courses
that can be taken for credit. Furthermore, it would be, in my judgment, both in-
feasible and unwise to attempt to change a law school's character by making nu-
merous appointments to staff those types of courses in the law school instead.
This curriculum failure has a straightforward solution that does not require
altering the character or organization of law schools: greater integration of
the law school business law and management school curriculums through the
development of a more streamlinedJD-MBAjoint degree program than exists
at present. In such a program, students would acquire the two degrees in three
rather than four years. Northwestern University has recently established just
such a program. The ABA's recent modest increase in the required number of
law school credit hours should have no impact on this type of program, but
other clarifying changes in credit rules, which require law schools to permit
students to graduate in five semesters, will quite likely encourage schools to
emulate Northwestern's lead in establishing such a program. I am convinced
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that such a program offers the most promising route for the education of the
next generation of the leading business lawyers.
There are alternatives to the solution that I am advocating to the business law
curriculum problem with which other law schools have been experimenting.
Some law schools, for example, offer certificates in law and business, programs
in which law students take a set of specified courses at the affiliated manage-
ment schoo\."3 While these programs are a step in the right direction from the
standard law school business law curriculum, the specified course lists do not
always include the requisite skills courses (or are structured so that students
need not take those courses). A streamlined joint-degree program is, in my
judgment, preferable for ensuring that students obtain both essential techni-
cal knowledge for a successful business law career and a richer and deeper
understanding of the business world than is possible through the subset of
business school courses in a certificate program. Of course, the more courses
a certificate program requires, the less important the distinction between such
a program and a streamlined (three-year) joint-degree program. Certificate
programs make sense as a time saver when compared to a conventional four-
year joint-degree program, but not when compared to an accelerated program
completed over three years.
The University of Virginia law school has followed a different approach,
creating a law and business program that requires a course in accounting and fi-
nance (offered in the law school) and thereafter provides students in that track
with deals-oriented courses. While this interesting innovation bears watching,
it concentrates on providing legal skills with less focus on technical founda-
tions. In my opinion the preferred balance of course work is the reverse, be-
cause the legal knowledge, as earlier noted, is more easily acquired on the job
than technical business knowledge and, as is true of clinical education more
generally, it is an expensive, labor intensive form of instruction. 24
23. The New York University and University of Pennsylvania law schools offer such certificate
programs, for instance, in which law students take five and three courses, respectively, from a
list of approved courses at the Stern and Wharton business schools. The NYU program also
has a summer component in which students take 9 credits of courses covering economics,
finance, and statistics; and LL.M. students as well asJ.D. students participate.
24. For a discussion touching on the cost of implementing transactions-oriented courses see
Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School Classroom,
2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 475 (2002). Changes in the organization of corporate law practice,
suggested by the trend of associates leaving large firms often after only a brief stay, may well
reduce the opportunity for young lawyers to receive on the job training: law firms will not
invest in educating associates if they cannot recoup the investment. If this trend becomes
pervasive, it may be necessary to include in the law school component of an accelerated
JD-MBA, transactions-based courses. It should, of course, be noted that several law schools
have been developing innovative transactions courses, sec, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Doing
Deals in School, Business Law Today (Sept/Oct. 2005), at 51. The difference between those
programs and the Virginia approach is twofold: Virginia requires technical skills training pri-
or to enrollment in transaction·oriented courses, and those courses are not solely advanced
seminars but also core corporate and commercial law courses in the business law track.
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The greater technical sophistication required of transactional lawyers will,
in all likelihood, further advantage top-tier institutions in producing business
lawyers, as those schools are better able to support financially joint-degree pro-
grams of the kind that I am advocating and that I believe to be the future:
there is a financial cost to a law school from any joint-degree program, let
alone a streamlined one (fewer semesters of tuition revenue than if the student
obtains only a JD and thereby registers for six law school semesters). This
dynamic also disadvantages stand-alone law schools, as well as law schools
within universities without a management school, as they do not have an insti-
tution with which to affiliate easily.
The state of education for students seeking to pursue a career in business
law teaching is, in my judgment, as troubling as that for those planning to
enter business law practice. Paralleling the need to innovate upon existing
JD-MBA programs, I believe that a new curricular initiative between law and
management schools is essential to train business law teachers, a jointJD-PhD
in finance!5 A law and finance PhD degree program would provide greater
focus and structure than an economics PhD program, the program currently
in place in many law schools (or a general business school PhD program), and
should be especially useful for an empirical research agenda, which is where
corporate law scholarship has moved over the last two decades.
My generation of corporate law academics, the first generation involved in
the intellectual revolution, could get up to speed by auditing graduate courses
in finance and econometrics: the field was new, and someone who had what
by today's standards was a relatively primitive knowledge of finance and eco-
nomics could make a contribution. A few in my generation, and an increas-
ing number in the succeeding generation, have PhD's in economics as well as
law degrees. But a problem with the latter route and the reason why creating
degree programs with management schools is needed, is that an economics
degree is not the best match for business law scholarship.
As earlier noted, the building blocks of the revolution in corporate law orig-
inate most prominently in modern finance, a specialized field of economics.
As a consequence, there is an imperfect match between the body of knowledge
imparted in an economics PhD program and that which is critical for analyz-
ing corporate law issues, and particularly for the direction in which the field
has been moving, in which quantitative methods playa large part. Graduate
economics department programs at most leading universities typically empha-
size theory, mathematical modeling, more than business school graduate pro-
grams, which, being professional schools, typically have a more applied bent,
and joint degree candidates studying in economics programs, reflecting their
training, invariably perceive that theory is a higher calling than empirical re-
search.
25. We have just established such a program at Yale. The program pares down the requirements
for the Ph.D. to the management school courses that provide the training that is most neces-
sary for business law research-finance, microeconomics, financial accounting-eliminating
valuable but more esoteric courses.
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Formal modeling has, in fact, played an important role in advancing legal
scholarship and I should not be understood to be saying that it is not valu-
able. Rather, the present state of corporate law scholarship suggests to me that
today there will be a lower likelihood of value added from pursuing formal
modeling than from quantitative research. Much of the first generation's work
was directed at using the intuitively graspable insights of finance and econom-
ics to analyze and rationalize the body of corporate law and to incorporate the
new control transactions within it. Not surprisingly, that work often offered
starkly divergent policy conclusions. More formal models following the earlier
work have not appreciably advanced the policy debate. In fact, much of the
more recent work is a straightforward replay, with more equations, of the 1980s
literature debating the same issues. We are at a point where empirical research
that facilitates the sorting out of theories will do more than further sophis-
ticated modeling to advance the state of knowledge. This argues for a more
applied, middle-range approach most consistent with what is emphasized in a
management school PhD program. ,6
There are two important reasons why empirical research has caught on with
contemporary corporate law scholars and will in all likelihood continue to do
so for quite some time. First, policy disputes are, at least in principle, resolv-
able empirically when there is consensus on ends, as there is among most U.S.
corporate law scholars since the field was transformed with the application of
finance and the theory of the firm (a consensus that the objective of public,
for-profit corporations is to maximize shareholder wealth). Second, empirical
research has become far more accessible and cheaper to undertake than de-
cades ago when the revolution in corporate law began. When I started law
teaching over twenty years ago, I had to use a mainframe at the university
computing center to access my data and the statistical programs that I was
using to analyze the data; I had to pick up bulky reams of paper with my
results, which sometimes were not available until the following day. Now one
can do far more sophisticated statistical work at home on a personal computer,
stock price data are directly downloadable from the web, powerful statisti-
cal programs run on pes, the results are virtually instantaneously available,
the statistics programs can be run interactively so one can immediately rerun
analyses to refine hypotheses and do robustness checks, results can be input
directly into word processing programs, and more. And virtually all of this is
done with no university charge for computer time. Simply put, the cost of un-
dertaking this kind of research has declined dramatically. Moreover, this line
of research plays to the comparative advantage of law professors, who tend to
be more steeped in institutional knowledge than most financial economists.
26. Readers of this article who are familiar with my own research agenda might note that what
I have described and am advocating sounds a bit more than self-serving, as it is the style of
my research. That is true. But this is the direction in which the field, for better or for worse,
has been moving-many of the younger corporate law scholars today have been increasingly
turning to undertake empirical research, at times working jointly with financial economists,
and for the succeeding generation, the level of technical sophistication required for making
a contribution will surely only increase.
HeinOnline -- 55 J. Legal Educ. 357 2005
After the Revolution in Corporate Law 357
Relations with Management Schools and the Prrfession
The revolution in corporate law has further implications that concern the
law school's relation with the rest of the university and the practice of business
law. It should come as no surprise that with more sophisticated knowledge of
finance and economics becoming the stock in trade, law school faculty in the
corporate field often intellectually share more in common with management
school faculty than with law school colleagues in non-business law areas. Law
school and management school faculty are often studying similar issues using
similar techniques. Indicia of this state of affairs are law and finance conferenc-
es organized jointly by law and business schools and publications of articles
jointly authored by law and management school faculty.
The quantum leap in specialization and technical sophistication of the busi-
ness law academic has important ramifications for law schools. It suggests that
larger law school faculties and law schools associated with universities with
management schools that have strong corporate finance groups (and good
relations between the schools) will have a comparative advantage over smaller
schools and those without such positive management school relations in re-
cruiting business law faculty and in maintaining first-rate business law pro-
grams. This is because given the specialized nature of their research, corporate
law academics will want to be part of a large business law group or to develop
close ties with management school faculty to compensate for the more limited
input that non-business law school colleagues can provide for improving their
work. This phenomenon should be of particular concern to smaller elite law
schools because it is doubtful that a school can maintain itself as a preeminent
institution by becoming a niche school and ceding business law to its larger
competitors.
What can schools with smaller-sized faculties do without changing their
character and becoming large schools, beyond modestly increasing their busi-
ness law faculty and encouraging cooperation with other units of their uni-
versities to be competitive in attracting quality business law scholars? One
adaptive device to the new environment with which many schools have already
been experimenting is the establishment of business law centers. The focus of
these centers is to enhance the intellectual life of the law school in the busi-
ness law area, and more specifically, to enhance the quality of faculty research
and ofstudents' educational experience by increasing exposure to and engage-
ment with contemporary business law issues. Corporate law centers typically
sponsor programs that invite business law faculty from other schools (as well
as management school faculty) to share their research, thereby expanding,
albeit temporarily, an in-house faculty group. While many law schools, and
not only elite institutions, both large and small, have created such centers, I
believe that there is more value added from having a center for smaller schools
because a center's activities can mitigate the school's size disadvantage while
the cost (in faculty time and resources) is not much greater for the small than
for the large institution.
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Corporate law centers are very much works in progress and the scope of
their functions is still being defined through innovation and experimentation.
But there are two common foci of activities that I believe bear special notice as
they will, in all likelihood, expand. First, many centers have sought to link up
with distinguished alumni in a variety of formats, including conferences, col-
loquia, and more informal sessions. The intermediation between law schools
and the profession assumed by the centers is a welcome trend that, it seems to
me, will become of increased importance because as business law faculty move
in the direction of greater technical sophistication, they run the risk of losing
touch with the transactional issues of the day and thereby producing scholar-
ship that will be arid and irrelevant. Centers are an ideal mechanism for keep-
ing the academic community connected with new developments because the
alumni who often generously support a center's activities and participate in the
programs are also the best source for up-to-date transactional information.
Second, centers have a role, as yet still largely uncharted, in the steady inter-
nationalization of corporate law practice that we have observed for some time
now. Comparative work on corporate governance is an active area of research
in both law and finance, with corporate law and finance scholars in the United
States, Europe, and Asia participating in numerous conferences and joint re-
search activity. The boom in cross-border mergers and the concomitant rapid
changes in corporate law regimes that have been occurring in Europe and Asia
in recent years suggest that the research activities of business law centers will
have a decidedly greater international and comparative focus.
The description of corporate law centers' programs presented thus far has
emphasized the ways in which they foster faculty research; but it is important
to note that the centers' programs have another important function for stu-
dents. Many law schools have a large public law faculty presence and students
who vigorously advocate expansion of public interest employment opportuni-
ties. These are perfectly fine developments. But students interested in business
law can, in such a setting, feel left out or intellectually isolated. Whether or
not such perceptions are accurate, corporate law center programs address such
perceptions by offering intellectual engagement and support for that group
of students, and provide the opportunity for students to project better what
a successful business law career could be like by facilitating student-alumni
interaction in an academic setting. My anecdotal observation is that such
perceptions are mitigated by enrollment in ]D-MBA joint degree programs,
which focus students' energy and activity. While streamlining the joint degree
program should help to mitigate that perception by increasing the number of
students who consider such a program attractive, center programs should also
aid in furthering a sense of belonging within the law school for all students
interested in the business law area.
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Conclusion
I have tried in this article to describe the state of corporate law today and
how we got here, and to suggest where we should be going. In the 1980s, cor-
porate law scholarship and practice were completely transformed in response
to intellectual currents in finance and economics and new transactional devel-
opments, which called for comprehensive legal innovation. Unfortunately, the
law school curriculum has lagged far behind that revolution. The good news
is that law schools can rectify this situation without having to make drastic
changes. Law schools just need to be more proactive in the business law area
concerning curricular initiatives, as experience has demonstrated that a less
attentive approach will not do.
